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TAMING THE UNRULY CRIMINAL LAW:  WHERE DO YOU DRAW THE 
BOUNDARIES OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT? 
 
ABSTRACT 
Criminal law is extending its boundaries to capture conduct that was previously 
described as civil or regulatory in nature.  For example, in some jurisdictions public 
nuisance, trespass, throwing things at a sporting match, photographing people in private 
places without their consent and BASE jumping from a building, are criminalised.  The 
unruly nature of criminal law is a serious problem for law makers who need to know 
what conduct should be criminalised and what conduct should not be criminalised to 
inform the scope of future criminal laws.  It is also a serious problem for members of the 
community who need to know the minimum standards of behaviour. 
 
The unruly nature of criminal law has occurred because several principles underpin the 
decision to criminalise conduct.  The unruly nature of criminal law has not occurred 
because the decision has been based on the toss of a coin.  Rather than recommending 
the shrinking of the criminal law to tame it, this paper explores the principles 
underpinning the decision to criminalise conduct.  Such principles include harm, 
immorality, community welfare, individual autonomy and the politics of lawmaking.  
Analysing these principles will result in a greater understanding of the decision to 
criminalise conduct.   
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To further understand the unruly nature of criminal law, this paper will contrast criminal 
wrongdoing from civil wrongdoing from the perspective of the wrongdoing and 
compensation distinction, public and private distinction, and the essentialist distinction.  
Making these contrasts will help determine where to draw the boundaries of criminal 
conduct.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The decision to criminalise conduct is multifaceted and justified by a range of 
“conflicting social, political and historical factors”.1  Simester and Sullivan conclude 
that “the sheer variety of conduct that has been designated a criminal wrong defies 
reduction to any “essential” minimum”.2  Similarly, Findlay, Odgers and Yeo say that 
there is no simple explanation about why the criminal law has pursued one direction and 
not another.3  However, they maintain that the boundaries of criminal law are based on 
rationality and justice and not merely chance or contingency.4  The development of 
criminal law has been unpredictable because of a “fundamental ambiguity of its central 
organising principles”.5  The justification for criminalisation stems from one or more 
principles selected during a value laden selection process.6  To understand the unruly 
nature of criminal law, this paper explores the principles underpinning the decision to 
criminalise conduct, for example, harm, immorality, community welfare, individual 
autonomy and the politics of lawmaking.  Further, it distinguishes criminal law from 
civil law by highlighting the wrongdoing and compensation distinction, public and 
private distinction, and the essentialist distinction.  Making these distinctions assists in 
sharpening the focus of criminal law,7 and thus understanding the decision to criminalise 
                                                 
1 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 17.  See also Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason 
and History (2001) 8. 
2 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 3.   
3 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 12. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Paul H Robinson, 'The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert' (1996) 76 Boston University 
Law Review 201, 212.   
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conduct or not.  Despite the unruly nature of criminal law,8  this paper will show that the 
decision to criminalise conduct is more principled than the toss of a coin.9   
 
HARM 
Several academics and theorists have identified the need for the harm principle to relate 
to harm to others and not merely harm to the offender (legal paternalism).  For example, 
Ashworth cites John Stuart Mill’s harm principle underpinning criminalisation, that is, 
“the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against, his [or her] will, is to prevent harm to others”.10  Mill 
argues that conduct should only be criminalised if it causes harm to others.  He impliedly 
rejects criminalisation if it merely protects the offender from harm.  Further, the use of 
the word only rejects criminalisation if it is based on any other ground.  With regard to 
harm to others, Mill’s view is consistent with the view expressed by Findlay, Odgers and 
Yeo, that is, that conduct should be criminalised if it injures the rights and interests of 
other people, that is, harms others.11  Feinberg is more explicit and accepts harm to 
others as a justification for criminalisation, but rejects legal paternalism.  In particular, 
Feinberg states, “It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would 
probably be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than 
the actor and there is probably no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost 
to other values”.12  Feinberg’s principle of harm also suggests that harm to others is only 
one consideration in the decision to criminalise conduct and opens the path for other 
considerations.    
 
One of the key issues to be determined in applying the harm to others test is the scope of 
harm.13  The flexible core of the notion of harm has made the harm to others test 
                                                 
8 See James Lindgren, 'Why the Ancients may not have Needed a System of Criminal Law' (1996) 76 
Boston University Law Review 29, 56. 
9 Contrast Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 184, 
184. 
10 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 30. 
11 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 3.   
12 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 26.   
13 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 10. 
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notoriously difficult to apply.14  There is a positive correlation between the scope of 
harm and the breadth of criminal laws.  However, the reality is that not every type of 
harm warrants the protection of criminalisation.   
  
Mill did not provide a definition of harm when espousing the harm principle, but 
Feinberg developed one.  Feinberg’s definition of harm is a “thwarting, setting back, or 
defeating an interest”.15  When determining the importance of interests, three factors are 
taken into consideration, that is, vitality, the degree to which they are supported by other 
interests and inherent morality.16  The harm principle invokes a balancing of the degree 
of probability of the harm and gravity of the possible harm compared with the social 
value of the conduct.17   A further requirement of harm is that it be wrongful.18  “One 
person wrongs another when his [or her] indefensible (unjustifiable and inexcusable) 
conduct violates the other’s right, and in all but certain very special cases such conduct 
will also invade the other’s interest and thus be harmful in the sense [of a setback to 
interests]”.19  While Feinberg’s definition of harm was a significant contribution to the 
harm principle, it has been subjected to criticism.   
 
One of the criticisms has been with respect to the ambiguity of the type of interest 
protected by the harm principle.  In particular, Ashworth notes that Feinberg’s definition 
of harm, which focuses on an individual’s legitimate interests, does not address the 
political, cultural or moral nature of the interest setback.20  Further, McSherry and 
Naylor conclude that the definition does not canvass wider social, indirect or gendered 
harms.21  They question whether “harm” encompasses indirect, potential, psychological 
                                                 
14 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and Materials, Law in 
Context (3rd ed, 2003) 8. 
15 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 33. 
16 Ibid 217. 
17 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 31.  Further, see Joel Feinberg, The 
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 216. 
18 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 105. 
19 Ibid 34.   
20 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 30. 
21 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives (2004) 
19. 
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or economic harm,22  without putting forward any arguments or a conclusion on these 
issues.    While direct and physical harms fall within the core of harm, it has nebulous 
edges.  These nebulous edges can be fixed by identifying the interests protected by the 
harm principle.23  Making choices about the interests protected is morally loaded and 
depends on one’s commitment to community welfare and individual autonomy.24  
However, this is necessary because if there was no conception of the relevant interests, 
the harm principle would be vacuous.25 
 
Some types of minor harm are not criminalised as they fall outside the scope of harm.  
For example, Feinberg states that “harm” does not canvass “mere transitory 
disappointments, minor physical and mental “hurts,” and a miscellany of disliked states 
of mind, including various forms of offendedness, anxiety, and boredom”.26  In contrast, 
some types of minor harms are criminalised, for example, dropping litter and illegal 
parking.27  The criminalisation cut-off point for minor harm depends on whether 
criminalising the harm causes more harm than it prevents.28   
 
Modern criminal law has found several good reasons for regulating minor harms, for 
example, it is cheap, convenient and quick.29  Thus, economic considerations and 
expediency have been used to justify criminalisation, without the need for conduct to 
reach a specific level of wrongfulness or falling within the category of most anti-social 
form of behaviour.30  This modern perspective of the criminal law is aligned with 
                                                 
22 Ibid.  Compare Gardner who focuses on the means of harming rather than on the types or degrees of 
harm:  John Gardner, 'Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against the Person' (1994) 53 
Cambridge Law Journal 502, 515.   
23 Neil MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982) 29. 
24 Ibid.  See also Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 32, and Paul H Robinson, 
'The Role of Harm and Evil in Criminal Law:  A Study in Legislative Deception?' (1994) 5 Contemporary 
Legal Issues 299. 
25 Neil MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982) 30. 
26 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 215-216.   
27 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 1.   
28 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Harm to Others (1984) 216. 
29 Nils Jareborg, 'Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio)' (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law 521, 524.   
30 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 48.  Further see Bernard E Harcourt, 'The 
Collapse of the Harm Principle' (1999-2000) 90 The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 109. 
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Farmer’s description of the criminal law as a “predominantly administrative system 
managing enormous numbers of relatively non-serious and ‘regulatory offences’”.31   
 
Criminalising minor harms is controversial.  For example, it goes against Ashworth’s 
normative claim that criminal law is “society’s strongest form of official censure and 
punishment, should be concerned only with major wrongs, affecting central values and 
causing significant harms”.32  However, Ashworth does not provide any guidance on the 
scope of the terms “major wrongs”, “central values” or “significant harms”, or whether 
they change over time with advances in technology.  Further, by criminalising minor 
harms, the harm principle fails to delineate the boundaries of criminal, quasi-criminal 
and civil laws.33  It also weakens the harm principle as a justification for criminalisation.  
Similarly, the criminal law would be undermined if all conduct that caused harm or had 
the potential to cause harm was criminalised.  For example, the criminal law would be 
labelled as “drastically over-used”.34  Further, it would “impair the criminal law’s 
nondeterrent functions.”35  Consequently, legislators need to carefully determine the 
dividing line between what harmful conduct falls within or outside the ambit of criminal 
law.36  
 
Lacey, Wells and Quick assert that the harm principle has a “strong common-sense 
appeal”37 and has a “significant place in the public debate about criminal law and its 
limits”.38  McSherry and Naylor note that the harm principle explains why conduct 
should not be criminalised, but has difficulty in explaining why conduct should be 
                                                 
31 L Farmer, 'The Obsession with Definition' (1996) 5 Social and Legal Studies 57, 64-66. 
32 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 17.   
33 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives (2004) 
19.   
34 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 4. 
35 John C Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models - And What Can 
Be Done About It' (1992) 101 The Yale Law Journal 1875, 1877.   Further, Ashworth suggests that 
unenforceable offences will bring the criminal law into disrepute:  Andrew Ashworth, Principles of 
Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 34. 
36 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 4.   
37 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and Materials, Law in 
Context (3rd ed, 2003) 9. 
38 Ibid. 
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criminalised.39  Additionally, Lacey, Wells and Quick “suggest that the harm principle is 
not only indeterminate at a normative level but also incomplete at an explanatory level.40  
Rather than offering an ideal or explanation, the harm principle offers “an ideological 
framework in terms of which policy debate about criminal law is expressed.”41  
Conceptual difficulties are not unique to the harm principle as immorality suffers 
similarly. 
 
IMMORALITY 
Lord Devlin advocated the eradication of immorality as a justification for criminalising 
conduct.  In particular, Lord Devlin claimed that morality underpinned the “social fabric 
of society”42 and immoral behaviour eroded “that fabric and consequently”43 
destabilised society.  Lord Devlin asserted that society will disintegrate unless immoral 
acts are criminalised, but did not provide any empirical evidence to support this.44  The 
Oxford Companion to Philosophy suggests that legislative responses to protect public 
morals prohibit or restrict “acts and practices judged to be damaging to the character and 
moral well-being of persons who engage in them or who may be induced to engage in 
them by the bad example of others.”45  Immorality has been criticised for justifying 
criminalisation for several reasons, including that it is not “pure legal moralism”,46 it is a 
secondary principle to the harm principle,47 and the scope of immorality.  
 
The scope of immorality is subject to debate.  Under the immorality principle, the 
criminal law should prohibit behaviour that is immoral according to the norms of a 
                                                 
39 Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical Perspectives (2004) 
19. 
40 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and Materials, Law in 
Context (3rd ed, 2003) 9. 
41 Ibid.  See also Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 19. 
42 As cited in Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 
3. 
43 Ibid.  Compare Hamish Stewart, 'Legality and Morality in HLA Hart's Theory of Criminal Law' (1999) 
52 SMU Law Review 201. 
44 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965) 8-14. 
45 Ted Honderich (ed), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (New Edition ed, 2005), under enforcement 
of morals.   
46 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 16. 
47 Ibid 17.  
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society.48  It is not confined to the teachings of a particular religion.  Ashworth notes that 
this is realistic in a British context because several religions with differing perspectives 
are practised in British society.49  Further, Ashworth contends that morality fluctuates 
with place and time.50  Lacey, Wells and Quick agree with Ashworth on this point.51  
Similarly, Simester and Sullivan assert that moral stagnation is unattractive.52  Further 
they suggest that “difference, even conflict, between the lives and values of citizens can 
be a dynamic force for the evolution of a vigorous, thriving, and valuable culture.”53   
 
Lord Devlin claimed that immorality “could be determined by enquiring into what every 
right-minded person considered immoral”.54  However, this has been criticised because 
it is doubted whether a shared immorality can be identified,55 and if so, it could be used 
to “discriminate against minority groups”.56  This is similar to an assertion made by 
Findlay, Odgers and Yeo, who claim that the definition of morality “may well stem from 
irrational prejudices rather than reasoned moral indignation”.57  They assert that morality 
is imprecise and rests on “mere feelings of disgust”.58   
 
Criminalisation on the basis of morality should be used sparingly.  This protects freedom 
of expression,59 and is consistent with the notion of minimalism and Feinberg’s 
suggestion that criminalisation is supported when it prevents “serious” immorality.60  
The term ‘serious’ is ambiguous and requires further explanation, if not quantification.  
Feinberg’s conclusion is similar to Bagaric, who recommends “limiting criminal law to 
                                                 
48 Ibid 20.   
49 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 41.  See also David Brown et al, Brown, 
Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot's Criminal Laws - Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process 
in New South Wales (4th ed, 2006) 91, and Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of 
Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 58. 
50 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 44. 
51 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and Materials, Law in 
Context (3rd ed, 2003) 5. 
52 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 17. 
53 Ibid. 
54 As cited in Bernadette McSherry and Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws:  Critical 
Perspectives (2004) 20.   
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid 21. 
57 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 3. 
58 Ibid.   
59 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 18. 
60 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law:  Offense to Others (1985) 1. 
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breaches of important moral principles.”61  However, Bagaric does not specify where to 
draw the line between important and unimportant principles, or provide any examples of 
them.  In contrast, Simester and Sullivan recommend a “thick skin” approach to 
criminalising immoral conduct and recommend that people tolerate incivility on the 
ground of “personal and cultural diversity”.62  This “thick skin” approach is consistent 
with minimalism. 
 
Bronitt and McSherry recognise that many serious offences have a moral dimension.63  
Lacey, Wells and Quick refer to these offences as “real” crimes.64  They recognise that 
the criminal law is a “system of quasi-moral judgment which reflects a society’s basic 
values”.65  Interestingly, Bagaric suggests that morality does not need to underpin every 
crime to be a valid justification for criminalisation.  In particular, Bagaric states that “for 
moral principles to explain and justify the settled rules of law only a significant portion 
of the rules need to be consistent with the background moral theory”.66  Bagaric could 
have strengthened this conclusion by supporting it with evidence, for example, 
comparing the proportion of criminal offences that are consistent with moral theory 
against the proportion of criminal offences that are not consistent with moral theory.  
Further, Bagaric leaves open for interpretation the point at which ‘significant portion’ is 
satisfied.  Presumably, the point lies between 50 per cent and 100 per cent.  Arguably, 
morality underpins the traditional real crimes, but may not justify the criminalisation of 
modern offences, which lack an explicit moral dimension and are regulatory in nature.67   
 
Bagaric acknowledges the civilisation of criminal law.  In particular, he provides some 
examples of modern criminal offences that are regulatory in nature.68  They do not 
                                                 
61 Ibid 193. 
62 AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2003) 16. 
63 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 58. 
64 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and Materials, Law in 
Context (3rd ed, 2003) 5.   
65 Ibid 4.  Further see Nicola Lacey, 'Abstraction in Context' (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
255, 266. 
66 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 184, 187. 
67 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and Materials, Law in 
Context (3rd ed, 2003) 5.   
68 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 184, 189. 
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protect any recognisable right69 and are aimed at controlling conduct.70  Further, “the 
modern criminal law does not universally promote or enforce any particular conception 
of morals”.71  In fact, some wrong conduct is not criminalised.72  Akin to this, Bagaric 
notes that some people “may scoff at or belittle others for breaching rules of etiquette, 
fashion trends or the rules of a sporting contest, we do not condemn people for doing 
so”.73  On the other hand, some conduct, which is not wrong, is criminalised.74   
Consequently, there appears to be a utilitarian and regulatory aspect to modern criminal 
law.75  Bagaric suggested that many offences would be decriminalised if criminal laws 
only dealt with breaches of important moral principles.76  This would lead to a massive 
shift in criminal law.  As modern criminal law is becoming more civilised in nature, it is 
more likely to be based on the promotion of community welfare than the preservation of 
morality.     
 
COMMUNITY WELFARE 
Ashworth asserts that criminalisation “may be justified as a mechanism for the 
preservation of social order”,77 which reduces or avoids “unnecessary hardship and 
financial cost to the community.”78  Thus, it is a social defence79 and implies that “there 
                                                 
69 Recognisable rights are established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (entered into by 
Australia on 10 February 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(entered into by Australia on 10 March 1976) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(entered into by Australia on 13 November 1980). 
70 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 184, 189. 
71 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005) 58. 
72 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and Materials, Law in 
Context (3rd ed, 2003) 4. 
73 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 184, 187.  
See also Paul H Robinson, 'A Theory of Justification:  Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal 
Liability' (1975) 23 UCLA Law Review 266, 272. 
74 Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law Text and Materials, Law in 
Context (3rd ed, 2003) 4. 
75 Ibid 4-5. 
76 Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 184, 193. 
77 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 22.  See also Michael Kirby, 'Editorial' 
(2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 181, 181. 
78 Andreas Schloenhardt, Queensland Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives (2006) 19. 
79 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 11. 
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is a public interest in ensuring that such conduct does not happen and that, when it does, 
there is the possibility of State punishment”.80   
 
Community welfare interests include “the fulfilment of certain basic interests such as 
maintaining one’s personal safety, health and capacity to pursue one’s chosen life 
plan”.81  These community welfare interests coincide with individual goals such as “life, 
liberty, property and health”.82  Despite having similar goals, the community welfare 
principle and the individual autonomy principle goals are derived in a different manner.  
Under the community welfare approach to criminalisation, the basic interests are 
determined objectively (based on democratic decision making), and are not determined 
according to the preferences of each individual.83     
 
Marshall and Duff explain why there may be alignment between individual and 
community welfare goals.   
 
“A group …[shares] the wrongs done to its individual members, insofar as it 
defines and identifies itself as a community united by mutual concern, by 
genuinely shared (as distinct from contingently coincident) values and interests, 
and by the shared recognition that its members’ goods (and their identity) are 
bound up with their membership of the community.  Wrongs done to individual 
members of the community are then wrongs against the whole community – 
injuries to a common or shared, not merely to an individual, good”.84 
 
Consequently, social welfare interests and individual goals may unite.   
 
Conversely, community welfare interests and individual goals may conflict.  Marshall 
and Duff have put forward a strategy for the community welfare principle to cope with 
                                                 
80 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 2. 
81 Ibid.  
82 See S E Marshall and R A Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence 7, 8.   
83 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 28. 
84 S E Marshall and R A Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 7, 20. 
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such a conflict.85   This requires an identification of the collective goals and the 
individual goals the criminal law should protect.  In the case of a conflict, collective 
goals may override individual goals, unless the individual goals are specifically 
recognised and protected in treaties and human rights legislation.86  This is consistent 
with Findlay, Odgers and Yeo, who conclude that criminal law is better to prohibit 
conduct that harms the public rather than a specific individual.87 Consequently, the 
community welfare principle recognises “the social context in which the law must 
operate and gives weight to collective goals”,88  rather than individual autonomy. 
 
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 
Findlay, Odgers and Yeo argue that the criminal law should respect individual 
autonomy.89  This means that conduct should only be criminalised to the minimum 
extent necessary to provide other individuals with the same autonomy.90  Advocates of 
the minimalist approach to criminal law are concerned about the overuse of criminal law 
because of its coercive and liberty-depriving consequences.91 Minimalism accepts the 
need to criminalise direct wrongs on victims and to safeguard interests, but is concerned 
that the State, groups or other individuals will abuse their power.92  Consequently, 
respect for individual autonomy is a justification for not criminalising conduct and is 
consistent with the notion of minimalism.     
 
Ashworth acknowledges that it is unsustainable for individuals to have complete 
freedom without qualifications.93  Jareborg argues that the criminal law could not protect 
all individual interests and that some individual interests are not worthy of protection.94  
                                                 
85 Ibid 11.  
86 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 29. 
87 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 5. 
88 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 28. 
89 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 3. 
90 Ibid.  Individual autonomy does not justify victimless crimes:  Mirko Bagaric, 'The "Civil-isation" of the 
Criminal Law' (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 184, 188. 
91 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (3rd ed, 2005) 4. 
92 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 31. 
93 Ibid 27. 
94 Nils Jareborg, 'Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio)' (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law 521, 526. 
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The criminal law’s protection of individual interests and values has been described as 
“selective…[and] fragmentary”95 in character.  In line with comment, Ashworth draws 
attention to gender bias in the criminal law.96  While not every individual preference can 
be reflected in the criminal law, Marshall and Duff identify some broad individual 
interests, for example, life, liberty, property and health.97  These examples are so broad 
that they overlap with the community welfare interests identified above.  As the notion 
of “individual interests” becomes broader, the argument for over-criminalisation 
becomes stronger. 
 
POLITICS OF LAWMAKING 
Some decisions to criminalise conduct are based on the politics of lawmaking.  For 
example, some criminal laws are enacted as the result of law reform commission reports 
prepared after consultation, campaign of a pressure group, greater public exposure of 
harms and the views of law enforcers.98  Criminalising conduct may be seen as an 
“instantly satisfying political response to public worries”99 about publicised 
inappropriate conduct.  It is more proactive than merely consulting with the public or 
commissioning research.  Ashworth agrees that the boundaries of criminal law are 
largely due to exercises of political power at various points in time.100  Ashworth 
concludes that “there are many offences for which criminal liability is merely imposed 
by Parliament as a practical means of controlling an activity, without implying the 
element of social condemnation which is characteristic of the major or traditional 
crimes”.101  This view is consistent with modern criminal law being used to implement 
‘regulatory’ offences, as discussed above.  Consequently, the growth of modern criminal 
law “may reflect particular phases in contemporary social history, as written by the mass 
media and politicians”.102 
                                                 
95 Ibid 525.   
96 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 27. 
97 S E Marshall and R A Duff, 'Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 7, 8. 
98 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, 2006) 25. 
99 Ibid 23. 
100 Ibid 1. 
101 Ibid 1-2. 
102 Ibid 25. 
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Prima facie, public opinion may appear to be an unintelligent place to determine whether 
to criminalise conduct or not.  However, Lacey, Wells and Quick recognise that ordinary 
people shape the definition of crime.103  They assert that public opinion and perceptions 
of public opinion are “enormously influential”,104 especially to politicians, who are 
accountable to the public.105  Consequently, the criminal law should be continuously 
scrutinised to maintain the respect of the public.106 
 
 
PRINCIPLES AND DISTINCTIONS 
As discussed above, the principles of harm, immorality, community welfare, individual 
autonomy and the politics of lawmaking may underpin the decision to criminalise 
conduct.  The principles endure conceptual difficulties and thus it is worthwhile 
distinguishing criminal law from civil law to inform the decision to criminalise conduct.  
This paper will explore the wrongdoing and compensation distinction, public and private 
distinction and the essentialist distinction.   
 
WRONGDOING AND COMPENSATION DISTINCTION 
The wrongdoing and compensation approach was espoused by Mann, who suggested 
that key distinguishing feature between criminal and civil law is that criminal law is 
meant to punish and civil law is meant to compensate.107  Seipp acknowledged this 
difference and referred to this as a “choice of vengeance or compensation”.108  Seipp 
contends that criminal law and tort law offer the victim a choice to pursue justice for a 
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wrongful act in two different ways.109  Seipp advanced an interpretation of this choice 
between criminal law and tort law as “one law for the rich and another for the poor”.110  
However, this interpretation does fail to recognise that some victims prefer to seek 
vengeance even though the offender may be wealthy.111  Other commentators have 
suggested that criminal law is only invoked when tortious remedies are insufficient.112  
Overall, the wrongdoing and compensation distinction focuses on the end result.  It does 
not provide much guidance on what types of conduct should be criminalised, except to 
say that criminalisation should be restricted to serious wrongs and used as a last resort.  
Of course, this leaves the debate about the level of “seriousness” open.  In any event, 
Lindgren rejects the wrongdoing and compensation distinction because he asserts that 
most torts and crimes are based on wrongdoing and blameworthiness.113  While this 
distinction is a useful starting point, the public and private distinction is more 
enlightening. 
 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DISTINCTION 
The public and private distinction asserts that criminal law focuses on collective 
interests.  In particular, the public and private distinction suggests that criminal law is 
“primarily public”114 and tort law is “primarily private”.115  Mann explains that criminal 
law sanctions certain wrongdoings because they “are public wrongs, violating a 
collective rather than an individual interest.  The criminal sanction will apply even if no 
individual interest has suffered direct injury.”116  This is consistent with Blackstone’s 
explanation that crimes are a breach of public rights that are due to the whole 
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community, while civil injuries are private wrongs and infringe individual civil rights.117   
Further, criminal law should be used to prohibit conduct that “society believes lacks any 
social utility, while civil penalties should be used to deter (or “price”) many forms of 
misbehaviour (for example, negligence) where the regulated activity has positive social 
utility but is imposing externalities on others”.118   
 
The public and private distinction reinforces a procedural difference between criminal 
law and tort law, that is, that the Crown brings the action in a criminal case because it 
involves public interests, whereas the plaintiff brings the action in a torts case.  More 
generally, Hall recognises that “crimes affect the whole community, considered as a 
community, in its social aggregate capacity…they strike at the very being of society, 
which cannot possibly subsist where actions of this sort are suffered to escape with 
impunity”.119  In this way, the purpose of criminal law is to control anti-social 
behaviour.120  Arguments have been for put forward to undermine the public/private 
distinction, that is, “that the personal is political or that the distinction is incoherent”.121   
However, these arguments are weak and this distinction illuminates the boundaries of 
criminal law in a more precise manner than the essentialist distinction.  
 
ESSENTIALIST DISTINCTION 
The essentialist approach is synonymous with the saying “a crime is a crime is a 
crime…”.122  This approach is based on gut feeling.123  In this regard, it may be 
analogised with preservation of morality, an aim of criminal law, because there is 
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unlikely to be a shared gut feeling.  Further, this distinction asserts that if the conduct 
was punished then it was criminal.  Consequently, this distinction is inward looking and 
does not explain modern criminal offences.  This distinction is flawed because it is not 
based on evidence, research or argument.124  It overlooks Coffee’s comment that both 
criminal law and tort law seek to deter behaviour through punishment.125  It also fails to 
recognise that some of the remedies available in criminal law are similar to tort law, for 
example, a fine and compensation.  Further, it does not explain why some types of 
conduct are regulated by criminal law and others are regulated by tort law.126  While the 
essentialist distinction has some serious weaknesses and is not the only tool to separate 
criminal law from tort law, its gut feeling core appeals to common sense.   
 
CONCLUSION 
There is no unifying justification that persistently underpins the decision to criminalise 
conduct.  The key principles discussed in this paper are harm, immorality, community 
welfare, individual autonomy and the politics of lawmaking.  The exploration of these 
principles provides guidance on what conduct should be criminalised or not.  For 
example, the harm and immorality principles need to be tamed in the criminalisation 
debate by providing a precise definition of “harm” and “morality”.  Similarly, 
community welfare and individual autonomy principles need to be tamed by developing 
a clear-cut definition of collective and individual interests, respectively.  The more 
unruly the definitions of “harm”, “morality”, “collective interests” and “individual 
interests”, the more likely criminal law is likely to encroach on civil law.  Other 
influences on the dividing line between contemporary criminal and civil law are 
exercises of political power, pressure groups and the role of the media in exposing 
controversial issues to public.   
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Distinguishing criminal law from civil law provides guidance on what conduct should be 
criminalised or not.  In particular, the wrongdoing and compensation distinction 
confirms that criminal law punishes wrongdoing and prohibits conduct.  This distinction 
implies that criminal law should be limited to serious wrongs and used as a last resort.  It 
is consistent with the principle of minimalism.  The public and private distinction holds 
that criminal law should protect collective interests, prevent social harms and prohibit 
(not merely price) conduct that does not have social utility.  The essentialist distinction 
criminalises conduct based on gut feeling.  Similarly, to the principles discussed above, 
the distinctions require the taming of certain terms, for example, “collective interests”, 
“morality” and “serious”.  The scope of these terms impacts on the dividing line between 
contemporary criminal law and civil law.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
